



# ENERGY TERRORISM SECURITY OF ENERGY IN ROMANIA AND EUROPEAN UNION NATO'S ROLE IN SECURITY OF ENERGY ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS INFLUENCING FACTORS

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## **Abstract**

*Energy security is defined as how energy supply, adequate and stable prices through critical infrastructure protection, helping to sustain and enhance economic performance. In recent years several developments testify to the importance of energy security: Europe's increasing dependence on oil and gas; need for increasingly higher energy rising powers like China and India; depletion of fossil fuels, which are estimated to begin in the middle of this century; a discussion of increasingly intense on climate change; a renewed interest of many countries to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Other additional factors include armed threats to the energy supply (terrorist or piracy) and political instability in many countries producing energy, including attempts of some of these countries to use energy supplies as a political weapon.*

## **Keywords**

Energy, security, hydraulic technology, energy flows, global market

## **1. Introduction**

Europe imports over 50% of the energy it needs. This dependence makes it vulnerable to political events taking place outside the EU.

The risks are greater in terms of gas supplies. At EU level, the largest amount of imported oil transported by sea; however, natural gas is supplied through pipelines. So, in case of need, there is little chance of changing sources and supply routes.

For producers of energy, energy security implies the existence of stable markets and of transport routes safe and economically viable. For transit countries of energy resources, energy security aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and there is a fair price for transit and for energy-consuming states, it aims constant access to energy resources and supplies at fair price stability. In this context, the energy issue concerns both trade and economic issues and security issues.

To ensure constant supply this winter, the EU proposed conducting "stress tests" that would simulate disrupting the supply of gas to see how the energy system reacts. This will help develop emergency plans and security mechanisms, such as increasing gas stocks to cope with any supply problems.

From geological reserves of natural gas are the main potential of the Black Sea Basin. For the development of new sources of gas, three strategic directions of Romania: mature conventional deposits increase productivity by applying new technologies for extraction; exploiting new discoveries in the continental

shelf of the Black Sea; development of gas-bearing clay deposits (shale gas).

In response to the current geopolitical situation and the EU's dependence on imports, the European Commission advocates a new European strategy for energy security. Diversification of supply sources external energy infrastructure modernization, completing the internal market for energy policy and energy savings are among its main points.

The strategy also emphasizes the need to coordinate decision-making in national energy policies and the importance of adopting a unified vision in negotiations with foreign partners. This is based on the progress already made in the gas crisis of 2009. The proposals, including as regards measures to ensure continuity of supply for the coming winter were discussed by the Heads of State or Government of the EU, the European Council June 26 to 27 this year

To ensure continuity of supply in the winter of 2014/2015, the Commission proposes comprehensive risk assessments (stress tests). They will be carried out at regional or EU level by simulating a gas supply disruption. The objective will be to check how the energy system can cope with risks of security of supply and on this basis to develop plans and create safety mechanisms. Such mechanisms could include increasing gas stocks, falling demand for gas using substitute fuels (mainly for heating), emergency infrastructure development, such as completing

opportunities reverse flow and pooling of part of stocks existing security.

Completion of the internal energy market and the construction of missing links in infrastructure is essential to react quickly in case of possible supply disruptions by directing energy flows as needed and where needed throughout the EU. The Commission has identified about 33 critical infrastructure projects for EU energy security. In addition, the Commission proposes to extend the lens on the interconnection of electricity generation capacity installed in 15% by 2030, taking into account the issues of cost and potential trade in the relevant regions. (Member States have already committed to provide interconnectivity 10% by 2020) and diversification supplier countries and transit routes.

In 2013, 39% of the EU's gas imports came from Russia, 33% in Norway and 22% in North Africa (Algeria, Libya). While the EU will maintain relationships with reliable partners, it will seek to establish links with other partner countries, for example in the Caspian basin region, continuing to expand the Southern Gas Corridor, developing gas hub Mediterranean and strengthening supply liquefied natural gas (LNG).

According to the "Report WEO 2009" in the period from 2007 to 2030, fossil fuels are the main source of primary energy in a 80% of total consumption. In Romania, the main resources required are imported gas and oil, but our country is much better positioned in terms of dependence on these resources compared to the rest of the EU. Thus the EU's dependence on oil is 86%, while Romania is 54%, while the EU's dependence on natural gas is 58%, the dependency is 42%. The development of new technology in the US but hydraulic allows the first shale gas extraction. In this context, the EU's total reserves would increase by about 70%.

In Romania, the import of crude oil is made mainly from Russia and Kazakhstan, but our country as a result of refining infrastructure made during the communist period, import or black gold in Azerbaijan and Middle East. The real problem lies in the realization of an alternative diversification of gas supply, vulnerability being created as a result of reliance on the Russian Federation.

The most important project of Romania's external energy policy, Nabucco, failed completely in June 2013, when competition for transport Azerbaijani gas to the EU was resolved in favor TAP (Trans Adriatic Pipeline). Southern Gas Corridor (CSG) will connect the Caspian Basin of southern Italy, Turkey, Greece and Albania. The decision was predominantly commercial, strategic needs at the expense of Eastern Europe. Although devoid of a major international project, Romania has sufficient ways to increase energy security.

For Romania energy security is prerequisite for the existence of the Romanian state and nation and a fundamental objective of the government. It has as its reference values, interests and objectives. Energy security is a right that stems from the constitutional law of the state over its energy resources, is fulfilled in the context of European, Euro-Atlantic cooperation and global developments. Riches of the underground public waters with energy potential of national interest, natural resources of the economic zone and the continental shelf, shall be exclusively public property and exploitation of natural resources in line with the national interest, the "protection and recovery environment and ecological balance "is the exclusive attribute of the Romanian state.

Romania's oil deposits are fragmented and aging and production per well is among the lowest in Europe. To stop the decline in production required large investments for redevelopment deposits and extraction efficiency technologies (increased pressure in the reservoir, drilling depths). OMV Petrom company is engaged a comprehensive program, managed in 2013 to halt the decline in production and achieve a slight increase in oil production compared to 2012. Similarly, the largest national producer of natural gas, Romgaz, obtained in 2012 a marginal increase in production over the previous year. However, the need for capital and know-how in this area is enormous, and the results can only be gradual and long term.

As the measures necessary to identify additional reserves to justify its decision to invest in exploration and production. An assessment well to be drilled in 2014 and the other about 10 deep wells by 2018 will be enlightening. Then, technological and logistical costs of exploitation deep are much higher than on land exploitation. There are also higher in the Black Sea region than in other parts of the world, because of shortage of offshore drilling equipment and the small number of service providers deep sea drilling.

Romania should consider some key elements (risks and threats) that configure the security environment of the region, particularly that of the wider Black Sea area. Among them we can mention:

- Conflicts of ethnic and ethno-religious nature (Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia);
- The existence of oppressive regimes and the phenomenon of radicalization of political opposition;
- Increasing Islamic militancy;
- Political and economic instability;
- Institutionalizing the phenomenon of organized crime as a force increasingly pervasive in the political, social and economic in different areas;
- Activation and development of terrorist organizations;

- Prevalence of corruption in the state, especially in governmental pyramid.

- Development of the underground economy, which includes both illegal economic activities and activities that are in the area of control of the state (tax and regulatory system parallel to that of the state) and provides livelihoods of citizens;

- Securing existing energy routes.

Securing energy routes, is considering measures to be taken to counter and avoid terrorist attacks or sabotage of energy infrastructure. If sabotage aimed, in particular, achieving economic upward, or used as a means of political coercion, the risk of occurrence of major attacks on energy infrastructure has increased in recent years.

The vulnerability of transport routes, so that the pipeline network and oil tankers transporting, make them the preferred target of terrorist attacks. To Romania, oil and gas pipelines are of national importance and should be considered strategic objectives.

At NATO, the great transformation of the 90 involved a transformation in the perception of security. NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 1999, identifies as security risk - cessation of supplies of vital resources. Since 2006, energy security becomes topic and NATO summits, especially in Riga (2006) and Bucharest (2008). The final declaration of the NATO summit in Riga, Allies stipulated that "Alliance security interests can be affected by the cut supplies of vital resources."

Energy security is not a new area for discussion and action within NATO, but with the Summit in Riga (2006) began to be considered part of a field by itself.

Romania is one of the NATO countries that supported the assumption by NATO of a more prominent role and particularly active in energy security, convinced that, through experience and capabilities, the Alliance can enhance the value of the efforts of other national and international actors important.

At the NATO summit in Bucharest (2008), NATO's role on energy security was treated in more detail and presented a report on "NATO's Role in Energy Security".

Allies have identified as principles governing the approach of NATO in the field and defined a number of options and recommendations for further work. Based on these principles, it was decided that, while continuing consultations on energy security risks, "NATO to engage in the following related areas: information sharing; projecting stability; encourage international and regional cooperation; support for consequence management and critical infrastructure protection energy".

Report prepared for subsequent Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl, 2009, noted progress on energy

security stressing also that issues such as safe and stable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and sources of energy, and the interconnection of energy networks remain critical. It was mentioned at the same time, continued support for efforts to promote energy infrastructure security.

These positions were reaffirmed in the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19-20 November 2010. NATO's Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon highlights the essential position in the definition of energy security environment for the Allies and - in this context - security is important transport routes of energy resources. Among the new threats to security, energy is one with a high potential to be subject to these threats. As such, the new NATO Strategic Concept states to develop their capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical infrastructure energy transit areas and routes, in cooperation with partners and in consultation interlude based on strategic assessments and planning ahead.

In the context of the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012 was reiterated ally that Alliance will continue to focus its efforts in areas that bring added value to energy security according to the profile of the organization. In this respect, an important role is opening and operation of the Centre of Excellence for Energy Security in Vilnius which aims to explore more efficient use of energy resources dimension in theaters; development efforts on energy critical infrastructure protection; developing political consultations and practical cooperation with partner countries of the Alliance.

Within NATO, energy security continues to be one of the areas polemical views allies ranging from the recommendation to increase the profile and extension of activities in the field, to a precautionary approach supported by the argument that this area mainly involves national decision.

The new NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 2010, gives the Alliance a more prominent role in energy security issues. Strategic Concept points to "the need to develop the Alliance's capabilities to ensure energy security by protecting critical infrastructure and transit routes, cooperation with partners and Allies consultation on the assessment and strategic planning." NATO's first mission designed to protect inland transportation of energy resources was established back in 2007, around the African continent.

For most NATO member states, energy security is an issue of major importance. Although the twenty-eight allies consumes 43% of global demand for oil and 42% of the gas, NATO member states have only 6% and 7% of global oil and gas resources. Much of the energy needs of the Allies are imported from abroad, which involves additional security risks. If in the case of oil,

the global market and its flexibility reduces any risk of unilateral dependence, for gas, regional market rigidity and transport routes unilateral perpetuates dependency risks.

All these developments point to the same direction: it is possible that energy supplies are not a direct military challenge, but it clearly has a security dimension. As an Alliance that provides protection to more than 900 million people and has a unique network of partnerships with various countries, NATO has a legitimate role to play in energy security.

For some reason, members of the Alliance exhibit considerable hesitation in addressing energy security.

One of the major reasons for this caution is diverging national interests represented. As energy security is largely considered a national economic issue, many countries do not want to discuss this issue in international forums. This is a challenge not only for NATO, but also for the EU. Despite efforts by the European Commission to develop an energy policy perspective, Member States continue to establish individual agreements with energy suppliers. In short, when it comes to energy, countries tend to care only for themselves.

Another reason for NATO's cautious approach to energy security is the fact that this area is intrinsically linked to Russia. Russia has the largest reserves of coal, gas and uranium in the world and ranks seventh in terms of oil reserves globally. As the Allies views on foreign policy, energy security and Russia were sometimes different (due to different degrees of dependence on Russia) there is still hesitation in employment in a debate that could degenerate into a pointless discussion about Russia.

Another reason for NATO's cautious attitude is the fact that energy security is already addressed by a considerable number of actors from the EU to the International Energy Agency and the OECD and by the private sector. Therefore, NATO's role can only be complementary by providing added value than assuming the leadership process.

Hesitation is generated and NATO alliance character whose identity is given primarily by its military means. While it is obvious that energy security can have a military dimension, many allies remain concerned that too visible a NATO role might unduly militarize a matter, first, of the economy.

## 2. Conclusions

The role of the Alliance in order to ensure energy security remains limited to the protection of critical infrastructure and project support "smart energy". These limitations are logical in the context of the Alliance is an intergovernmental political-military organization, in which major decisions are adopted by

consensus. Energy security is considered a matter of national order, managed through bilateral mechanisms. Except countries in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO avoids lobbying in favor of a more active role in managing energy problems Alliance.

The process of developing energy security policy must have as prerequisites primacy of values, interests and social needs against the socio-political group.

All these issues must be addressed and resolved in a responsible manner when reviewing international energy strategy in place at this time is exceeded, inapplicable to new social and economic circumstances.

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